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Social identity, national and supranational attachment
WHILE RECENT RESEARCH HAS RAISED THE QUESTION of how support for
integration is inﬂuenced by identity and utilitarian factors (Hooghe & Marks 2005;
Gabel 1998), in this essay we step back and ask what the underlying structures of
supranational identity are. European identity, a complex phenomenon, may be
approached by examining, among other aspects, attachment to Europe. Checkel and
Katzenstein (2009), who depict European identity formation with darker colours of
uncertainty and anxiety rather than hopes and assurance, distinguish between two
versions of European identity. In one it is a process, an outcome of deliberation,
exchange and the unintended consequences of spontaneous social processes such as
increasing cross-border communication. In the other case supranational identity
formation is more purposeful; it is the result of elites’ identity-building eﬀorts. There is
little doubt about the ability of elites and the media to inﬂuence identity-formation
using consciously-applied symbols (Bruter 2005), and even the projection of
reinvented myths and a strengthened sense of imagined communities (Anderson 1983).
When people describe what and who they are, they can start out by using
personality traits—modesty, courage, honesty—or from social categories like gender,
age, family status and occupation. The latter categories designate basic social
coordinates comprising social identity. The literature on identity distinguishes between
social categories and social groups. To the extent that belonging is associated with
internal cognitive, evaluative and emotional elements it may be considered to be social
group membership, but when an external designation applies, ‘belonging’ may fall into
a social category (Tajfel 1982; Brubaker & Cooper 2000). It is equally important to
understand, however, that some characteristics cannot be inﬂuenced, while others can
be modiﬁed and moulded. Some are accepted as endowments, while others are
constraints on life chances (Dahrendorf 1980). Personality traits, on the one hand, and
belonging to social categories and groups on the other, are the two major dimensions
of identities; this essay focuses on the social.
International comparative surveys have found that the typical markers of social
identity that are regarded as most important are family status and occupation,
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followed by gender and age, then the variables of national and regional attachment.
Belonging to a class, party, ethnicity or religion are less important markers all over the
world, even though they may have great mobilising force in conﬂicts. The primary
diﬀerence is not that family status, occupation, gender and age are less abstract or
group-like categories than class, religion, nation or ethnicity; the diﬀerence in
mobilising force derives mainly from the fact that the latter are supported by
institutions, ideologies and organisational interests, while the categories of family,
occupational and demographic identity are not—or are to only a smaller degree. In
one Hungarian survey, in addition to enquiring about the above categories the
parameter of ‘identiﬁcation with Europe’ was also included. It was found that
European identiﬁcation followed gender, age, occupation, locality and nation, while
far fewer respondents mentioned class, party, religion or ethnicity as a way of
identifying themselves (Lengyel & Go¨ncz 2006).
In this essay I focus on the supranational attachment prevalent in the elites and
publics of Europe. The reason that European attachment is considered here to be an
aspect of supranational identity, instead of a proxy of it (Antonsich 2008), is that
attachment associates with mostly emotional elements and not cognitive or evaluative
ones. Unless otherwise mentioned, the primary source of the following analysis is the
2007 wave of the international comparative research project Intune (Integrated and
United), supported by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission
(FP6). In 16 European countries parallel surveys were conducted both in the political
and economic elite and within the adult population, concentrating on questions of
identity, scope of governance and representation. Participating countries were Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia and Spain: all EU-members except
for Serbia.1 According to the survey design the elite samples consisted of 80 MPs and
40 top business leaders (bankers, managers and leaders of employers’ organisations)
per country, while the general population surveys were based on 1,000-strong
representative samples of the respective countries.
Elites and citizens, East and West: are there diﬀerences?
In a previous paper which focused on elites, I tried to ﬁnd out whether Eastern and
Western European elites diﬀered in regard to identity, assessment of EU goals and
support for integration, and whether there were noticeable diﬀerences among East
European countries in these respects (Lengyel 2009). At ﬁrst glance, the East
European elites had less commitment to the supranational entity, were less supportive
of the institutions of integration and identiﬁed competition as the main goal of the
EU. There were huge intra-regional diﬀerences as well: the Hungarian elite for
example had above-average identiﬁcation with Europe, support for integration and
preference for the strengthening of competitiveness. Yet deeper analyses made clear
that in some regards East–West diﬀerences disappeared as they were simply mediating
the eﬀects of other explanatory factors. Diﬀerences in symbolic or ideological
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1Since in the Czech Republic and in Lithuania only the elites, and in Slovenia only the population
were surveyed, they are therefore omitted from the present analysis.
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aspects—identity and goals—disappeared, while they remained in the explanation of
pragmatic aspects: the East European elites remained the more moderate supporters of
integration and supranational institutions when this support was investigated together
with cultural, social and other diﬀerences (Lengyel 2008). What actually explained the
supranational commitment of the elite was the level of education and social resources.
In this regard, however, there was found to be a more signiﬁcant discrepancy between
the elites of the founding EU members and later EU entrant countries than between
Eastern and Western elites.
In this essay I return to the question of the symbolic and pragmatic attitudes
towards the EU of diﬀerent country groups, investigating public opinion in the
respective countries as well as the views of political and economic elites.
In general the research found that the East–West divide has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
European attachment within political and economic elites while there is a weak impact
of these territorial and historical diﬀerences on European attachment within the
general population. Country diﬀerences, however, prove to be important in terms of
European attachment, especially among elites. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between East and West European economic elites in terms of attachment to their
countries but political elites diﬀer from each other according to country groups more
than the population does.
There are greater diﬀerences concerning pragmatic issues than symbolic ones.
Statistics for attitudes to further uniﬁcation in Table 1 are stronger (and in several
cases more signiﬁcant) than they are for attitudes concerning European attachment.
The opinion of economic elites about further support for uniﬁcation is correlated more
strongly with geographical factors such as the East–West distinction than is the case
for the political elites and the general population.
East–West comparison of the political and economic elites reveals no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences, though the ‘very attached’ categories diverge in both elite groups. The
diﬀerence is that in Western elites the rate of those ‘very attached to Europe’ is higher
than in their Eastern counterparts. Since, however, samples are smaller here, the
divergence does not reach a level of signiﬁcance whereas in the general population this
rate is a little higher in the East—which is suﬃcient to cause signiﬁcant deviation
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TABLE 1
IMPACT OF EAST–WEST AND COUNTRY DIFFERENCES ON ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE, TO THE COUNTRY
AND ON THE SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION (CRAMER’S V VALUES)
Attachment to Europe Attachment to the country Support for uniﬁcation
Political elite
East–West ns 0.14**** 0.183****
Country 0.237**** 0.289**** 0.31****
Economic elite
East–West ns ns 0.259****
Country 0.252**** 0.268**** 0.354****
General population
East–West 0.023* 0.09**** 0.074****
Country 0.168**** 0.171**** 0.238****
Notes: ****level of signiﬁcance is 0.0001; ***level of signiﬁcance is 0.001; **level of signiﬁcance is 0.01; *level
of signiﬁcance is 0.05; ns¼ not signiﬁcant.
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owing to the large sample. In other categories there is no remarkable deviation,
although in the Western samples the ‘somewhat attached’ response is a little more
prevalent.
Against this, there is signiﬁcant divergence between elites and the population as
regards European attachment: over one-third of members of the elites (two-ﬁfths of
Western elites) are strongly attached while the corresponding rate among the
population is less than a quarter. This diﬀerence is more marked in West European
countries (see Table 2).
As one could expect, both elites and the population are much more attached to their
country than to Europe. Within the Eastern political elites and populations there is
stronger attachment to one’s own country than is found for West European countries
(with no signiﬁcant deviation being found in the economic elite in this respect; see
Table 3). The divergence between the elite and the population as regards national
attachment is less marked than for European attachment. National attachment was
higher in the political elite than in the population and the economic elite. Due to the
fact that, according to the sample design, the political elites were members of the
national parliaments, a strong national attachment was more markedly asserted as a
norm in this case. It is worth noting that, while in the case of supranational attachment
the two elite groups were close to each other, in the case of national attachment the
economic elite is closer to the population, especially in the East.
As regards pragmatic implications of attitudes to the EU, this was approached by
considering the degree to which further integration was supported. This was found to
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TABLE 2
EUROPEAN ATTACHMENT OF ELITES AND THE POPULATION IN WEST AND EAST EUROPE (% ANSWERING
THAT UNIFICATION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED; % OF ANSWERS RANKED 7 AND ABOVE ON A 10-POINT
SCALE)
Political elite Economic elite General population
(n¼ 1,234) (n¼ 636) (n¼ 15,760) Cramer’s V
West 39.6 39.5 22.2 0.115****
East 36.8 34.4 24.1 0.096****
Cramer’s V ns ns 0.023*
Note: ****level of signiﬁcance is 0.0001.
TABLE 3
ATTACHMENT OF ELITES AND THE POPULATION TO THEIR COUNTRY IN WEST AND EAST EUROPE
(% ANSWERING THAT UNIFICATION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED; % OF ANSWERS RANKED 7 AND ABOVE
ON A 10-POINT SCALE
Political elite Economic elite General population
(n¼ 1,244) (n¼ 641) (n¼ 16,069) Cramer’s V
West 70.7 62.1 57.0 0.055****
East 81.6 63.7 65.2 0.065****
Cramer’s V 0.14**** ns 0.093****
Note: ****level of signiﬁcance is 0.0001.
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be signiﬁcantly higher in Western elites than in the Eastern European elites. Especially
great were the deviations in the economic elites, while similar but less marked
diﬀerences were found in the samples of the populations. To be more accurate, the
question on uniﬁcation was answered in the positive by both the elite and the majority
of the population.2 Table 4 below indicates strong support as shown in the percentage
of responses ranked 7–10 on a 10-point scale. It can also be gleaned that the deviation
between the opinions of the elite and the population in regard to supporting further
integration is greater in the West European countries than in Eastern Europe. It is
true, however, that in the West a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of the population
supports further uniﬁcation when compared to Eastern Europe.
West and East European citizens do diﬀer in many other ways concerning their
perceptions of the EU: West Europeans think (in signiﬁcantly higher proportions) that
they would be seriously neglecting their duties if they did not vote in elections for the
European Parliament; they trust more in fellow Europeans; and they consider that
what happens to Europe impacts on their personal life. West Europeans are
signiﬁcantly more satisﬁed with the way democracy works in their countries (51%
compared to 39%). They were, however, more concerned and divided about the
economic conditions of their country in 2007. A higher proportion of them felt that
economic conditions had either got better or worse, while a higher proportion of East
Europeans felt no change in this respect.
As for evaluation of their country’s EU membership, one can see a similarity and yet
a basic diﬀerence. West Europeans report (in signiﬁcantly higher proportions) that EU
membership of their country is a good thing. However they mention (signiﬁcantly over
the average) that membership is a bad thing as well. This was possible because there was
a third option which could have been voiced spontaneously, that it was neither good
nor bad, and East Europeans were over-represented in their choice of that option.
In terms of threats caused by the fact that people, money and ideas travel quickly
across borders, there is no major diﬀerence between East and West Europeans: more
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TABLE 4
SUPPORT FOR UNIFICATION WITHIN WEST AND EAST EUROPEAN ELITES AND THE GENERAL POPULATION
(% ANSWERING THAT UNIFICATION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED; % OF ANSWERS RANKED 7 AND ABOVE
ON A 10-POINT SCALE)
Political elite Economic elite General population
(n¼ 1,174) (n¼ 628) (n¼ 14,522) Cramer’s V
West 66.8 70.6 40.9 0.124****
East 48.4 45 33.3 0.097****
Cramer’s V 0.183**** 0.259**** 0.074****
Note: ****level of signiﬁcance is 0.0001.
2The question was: ‘Some say European integration should be strengthened. Others say it already
has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point scale, ‘‘1’’ means
uniﬁcation ‘‘has already gone too far’’ and ‘‘10’’ means ‘‘it should be strengthened’’. What number
from this scale best describes your position?’
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than half in both groups think that these are threats to security and well-being. As for
culture and way of life, the average proportions are also similar, but East Europeans
feel that these globalisation phenomena are more serious threats.
Further shades of opinion can be discerned from the picture of an East–West
dichotomy if we subdivide the group of Western countries and examine the
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) as a separate group
(Conti et al. 2010). In terms of European attachment, this causes little change, but in
regard to attachment to one’s country, there is very strong divergence between the
Western and Mediterranean elites. Among political leaders, the Mediterraneans are
characterised by similar levels of attachment to the Eastern Europeans. In the
economic elites, national attachment is even higher than among the Eastern elites. The
diﬀerence between elites and the population is also more pronounced in Mediterra-
nean countries than for Western or Eastern groups. In all countries political elites
show signiﬁcantly higher attachment to their countries than their corresponding
populations do. While in the West and in the East the national attachment of
economic elites is close to that of the population, in the Mediterranean region it is
closer to the attitude of the political elite.
Taking the Mediterranean countries separately, the truly salient diﬀerence was
found in respect to pragmatic attitudes to the EU. The previously found higher level of
support for the EU in the West was largely due to well above average support for the
EU in the Mediterranean countries. This ﬁnding applies particularly to the political
elites, but it is also valid for the economic elite and the population. As regards popular
support for the EU, it appears to be the same in the East and in the West when the
latter is taken into account without the Mediterranean countries. Outstandingly high
EU-support can be found among the Mediterranean population.
Hard and soft Euroscepticism
Opinion polls of the Hungarian public have registered that, after initial heightened
expectations, it soon became disillusioned by the EU. Indeed, even when viewed from
an international perspective there was a considerable decline in the quantity of positive
answers to questions like: ‘Do we beneﬁt from the EU?’ or ‘Is joining the community
useful for the country?’ It is, however, expedient to diﬀerentiate between the concepts
of soft and hard Euroscepticism in opinion polls, just like in policy analyses. In
political science hard scepticism characterises a position that is in opposition to the
EU and integration in principle, while soft Eurosceptics do not object to the EU in
theory but question speciﬁc policies (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008). Thus, in opinion
polling, we have to distinguish between those who symbolically reject a supranational
identity (on a theoretical, ideological or emotional basis) from those who ﬁnd no
beneﬁt in such integration or do not regard it as positive.
Soft Euroscepticism alludes to pragmatic–utilitarian attitudes that could easily
change with changes in policy. Hard Euroscepticism refers to symbolic, ideological or
emotional rejection, which is presumably more diﬃcult to change and has diﬀerent
motivational origins.
According to our study, somewhat more than one-third of the European population
was found to hold a hard Eurosceptic position, while the corresponding rate among
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political and economic elites was only between 13% and 16%. Looking at countries
individually in Table 5, the British, Bulgarian, Greek and Estonian, as well as the
French, Spanish, Slovakian and Serbian populations, had above-average aversion to
the supranational entity. The elites, as seen earlier, were less unsympathetic than the
populations, with the exception of the British political elite, which was as unattached
to Europe as the British population.
A very small proportion of the elites thought that their countries did not proﬁt from
EU membership, as compared to over a quarter of the population. Particularly
negative were the attitudes of the British and Hungarian populations, and somewhat
less so the French and German adult populations. Among the political elites, the
Danish, Hungarian, Polish and Serbian appeared to be sceptical. Among the economic
elites, the low rate of mentions resulted in a ﬂoor eﬀect and there was no signiﬁcant
correlation. A total of 18% of the general population rejected further uniﬁcation,
compared to 11% and 7% of the elites. The Austrian and British public were
particularly sceptical, with the political elites of the latter sharing the opinion of the
population. The case of the Estonian elites is particularly remarkable since they
rejected further enlargement of the EU even more strongly than the general
population.
From background calculations it turns out that neither East–West nor East–West–
Mediterranean country group diﬀerences are correlated to hard Euroscepticism. In
other words East, West and Mediterranean elites do not diﬀer concerning a lack of
European attachment. Nonetheless, they do diﬀer in terms of soft Euroscepticism.
While, compared with other elites, the Eastern elites opposed further uniﬁcation most,
in the case of the general population it was the Western European population that was
above-average in its negative opinion. Taking a closer look however, it turns out that
there is a huge diﬀerence within the ‘Western’ block: the Mediterranean public was the
least sceptical concerning uniﬁcation, and the Western public in the narrow sense was
the most sceptical. The same holds true in the case of the other indicator of soft
Euroscepticism: one-third of the Western, but less than one-sixth of the Mediterranean
public, felt that their country has not beneﬁted from integration. Among the Eastern
countries one can see below-average hard Euroscepticism in Hungary and Poland. On
the other hand, soft Euroscepticism in the Hungarian population is found to be among
the highest of all countries: more than half feel that the country has not beneﬁted from
being a member state of the EU.
Attachment to Europe, attachment to the EU
According to critics the presentation of questions about European attachment instead
of EU attachment in international surveys may reﬂect the deliberate intention of
supranational elites to manipulate identity formation (Immerfahl et al. 2010). After
all, people who denigrate the EU as an institution may well be attached to Europe,
while attachment to the EU without attachment to Europe is less likely to happen, and
for this reason attachment to Europe could be considered a symbolic aspect of
supranational identity. Even if there is no conscious attempt at manipulation, it should
indeed be examined whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between European
attachment and EU attachment.
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It stands to reason that the EU institutions themselves generate a European identity,
but it would be a mistake to overlook the European identity that exists independently
of the EU. This concerns not only public opinion in non-EU member countries but
also the idea that there is a continental identity in the public of the member countries
that is free from the frame of the EU. Eurobarometer approached the issue in diﬀerent
survey waves with diﬀerent wording: in 1991 it used the phrases ‘European
Community’ and ‘Europe as a whole’, while in 1995 it utilised ‘European Union’
and ‘Europe as a whole’. The question is whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between European and EU attachment. This can be answered in two ways: by
comparing the results for diﬀerent years, and by comparing the results of the same
survey in respect of both diﬀerences between responses on attitudes to the EU and to
Europe more generally. First I compare the results from 1991 and 1995 (see Table 6).
According to these measures there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between attachment
to Europe and to the EC or EU. There was a slight drop between 1991 and 1995
concerning both continental and institutional attachment, but no variance within the
same year. The problem with comparing the results of diﬀerent years however, is that
there are many changing conditions which may inﬂuence results, including, among
other variables, the mood of the target population and the political context. The
problem with asking parallel questions in the same questionnaire on the other hand is
that questions concerning Europe or the EU may have an equalising mutual inﬂuence
on each other.
A more precise result could be expected from an empirical survey applying split
ballots in a given year. If two statistically comparable sub-samples are addressed with
questions—one concerning ‘European’ and the other ‘EU’ attachment—at one and the
same time, in this way both changing political contexts and question cross-eﬀects
could be neutralised. In a recent Hungarian omnibus survey we investigated the
question using this design (see Table 7).
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TABLE 6
ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE AND TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/EUROPEAN UNION, 1991 AND 1995,
GENERAL POPULATION, MEMBER STATES (%)
1991* 1995**
The European
Community
Europe as
a whole
European
Union
Europe as
a whole
Very attached 12.3 13.1 9.3 9.5
Fairly attached 38.3 37.7 35.2 34.3
Not very attached 32.2 30.2 38.3 37.4
Not attached at all 17.2 18.9 17.2 18.9
N 12,286 13,155 15,681 15,684
Notes: *‘People may feel diﬀerent degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their
country, to the European Community or to Europe as a whole. Please tell me how attached you feel to . . . ?’
**‘People may feel diﬀerent degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country, to
the European Union or to Europe as a whole. Please tell me how attached you feel to . . . ?’
Source: Eurobarometer 1991/2 and 1995/2, available at: http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer/data-access/,
accessed 31 May 2010.
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As one can see from these results, the context of Europe and the EU is not neutral.
Although the majority of the Hungarian population is attached both to the EU and to
Europe, the intensity of attachment is signiﬁcantly stronger in the case of Europe. The
problem with this result is that it is based only on Hungarian data and its wider
relevance would need to be veriﬁed. Although it seems to be reasonable to suppose
that there are similar diﬀerences in other countries as well, it may happen that post-
crisis Hungary is a special case in this respect, at least as far as the size of attachment
variance is concerned.
Further diﬀerences within Eastern Europe
There are massive diﬀerences in attitudes among the countries of Eastern Europe. The
Estonian elites are sceptical (Vetik 2003) while the Polish and Hungarian elites are
enthusiastic about symbolic supranational issues.3 Concerning support for integration,
the picture is more shaded when controlled for the use of diﬀerent variables, but the
Estonian elites remain sceptical and the Hungarians remain supportive of suprana-
tional institutional solutions. (A relative rapprochement of the elite and the public is
more typical of Mediterranean countries which appear to prefer social security to
economic competitiveness.)
Turning the attention to the general public one can see that Hungary ranks well
above average concerning the proportion of those who felt very attached to Europe.
The high rate of symbolic supranational identiﬁcation exceeds not only the East
European but the West European and Mediterranean averages as well. This
population—together with the Bulgarians—exceeds most of the rest in terms of
national attachment. In pragmatic terms however, the Hungarian and Bulgarian
populations are less enthusiastic. Only a quarter of the Hungarian, less than one-third
of the Bulgarian (and less than a quarter of the Estonian) population supported
further uniﬁcation in contrast to half of the Polish population, and more than half of
the Mediterranean population (see Table 8).
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TABLE 7
ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE AND TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2010, GENERAL POPULATION, HUNGARY
Sample A Sample B
(Attachment to Europe) (Attachment to the EU) Together
Very attached 37.4 23.0 30.2
Fairly attached 41.1 36.0 38.6
Not very attached 16.2 31.3 23.7
Not attached at all 4.9 9.3 7.1
Don’t know 0.4 0.4 0.4
N 506 505 1,011
Note: Cramer’s V¼ 0.22****.
Source: author’s calculation.
3Such diﬀerences, however, are present among the Western elites as well; let us here just mention the
extremes: the scepticism of the British and the supportiveness of the French elites.
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While three-quarters of Mediterraneans and two-thirds of West Europeans think
that their country’s EU membership is a good thing, only three out of ﬁve of East
Europeans think this way. Positive evaluation is especially low in the case of Hungary
where almost a quarter think that EU membership is a bad thing (see Table 9). This is
not exceptional, it is actually close to the West European average, while the
spontaneously oﬀered ‘neither good, nor bad’ type of answer is represented at well
above the average rate. What is strange is that a negative evaluation from a pragmatic
perspective is accompanied by a strong symbolic supranational attachment.
Long-term perspective and ﬁeldwork
It is worth making some remarks concerning the long-term expectations of the EU.4
One is that the citizens of old EU member states are more pessimistic than those of the
455
460
465
470
475
480
485
490
495
TABLE 9
EVALUATION OF THE COUNTRY’S EU-MEMBERSHIP IN EASTERN EUROPE (%)
Generally speaking, do you think that the country’s membership of the European
Union is . . . ?
A good thing A bad thing Neither good nor bad (spontaneous)
West 67.2 24.7 7.9
Mediterranean 78.0 9.9 12.1
Bulgaria 62.7 8.0 29.3
Estonia 66.6 8.6 24.8
Hungary 43.1 22.6 34.3
Poland 77.1 9.5 13.4
Slovakia 58.9 5.4 35.7
Serbia 61.1 18.1 20.8
Notes: Cramer’s V¼ 0.236****; N¼ 15,641.
TABLE 8
ATTACHMENT AND SUPPORT OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES’ POPULATIONS (%)
Very attached to Europe Very attached to the country Support of uniﬁcation
West 22.4 55.6 32.4
Mediterranean 21.5 59.1 54.1
Bulgaria 16.3 77.9 30.5
Estonia 14.2 68.7 22.2
Hungary 46.5 76.4 25.5
Poland 23.6 68.2 50.3
Serbia 18.9 61.2 39.2
Slovakia 18.9 40.7 30.4
Phi¼ 0.16**** 0.223**** 0.193****
N¼ 16,119 14,522 16,069
Note: ****level of signiﬁcance is 0.0001.
4‘Expectations of European citizens regarding the social reality in 20 years’ time’, Flash
Eurobarometer # 227, The Gallup Organization, 2008.
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new members, and the majority envisage a deterioration of their living conditions in
the long run and a growing gap in social diﬀerences. So far we have found that the
citizens of old member countries were more optimistic, satisﬁed and supportive than
the citizens of new entrant states. Perhaps this was so because respondents were asked
usually to consider the near future, but if they are asked about prospects over a longer
time reference, their perspective is reversed. For citizens of Western countries ‘there is
nowhere to go but down’ which may be a consequence of the recession or integration.
In the latter case, overtly or covertly the pre-enlargement state could be conceived as a
Pareto optimal in that some members can only be promoted to the detriment of some
others and citizens of older member countries fear they could become these ‘others’.
The opinions of the citizens of new member countries who are less optimistic and
supportive in the present in terms of living standards, competitiveness or social
security may reﬂect a catch-up eﬀect, that ‘there is a lot to make up for’ in terms of
living standards, competitiveness or social security. Institutional conditions might also
support the attitude that looks upon the EU (however suspiciously or inimically) as a
power that is able to regulate national administrations, despite—or because of—the
crisis. Such opinions are, obviously, not free from contradictions, particularly when
the formations in question are distant and rather abstract and can be easily coupled
with views that associate threats with integration. This was suggested, for example, in
a sociological ﬁeldwork exercise carried out by students at Corvinus University of
Budapest who had to keep a logbook in addition to questionnaires, interviews and
visual documentation, in which they had to describe the interview situations,
comments elicited by the questions and problems of interpretation. From a
methodological point of view, these logbooks are very instructive as they reveal
something that is regrettably overlooked due to a lack of time, even when the protocol
of inquiry is observed strictly. They may provide examples of unexpected aspects of
the issue under investigation. This is an example from a logbook of how a negative EU
image is mitigated by a question on national economic policy:
The respondent was a lady in her forties, whose son also arrived a little after our entry and
who also listened to the questionnaire attentively. The lady was vehemently against the EU,
not veiling her political views. Interestingly, when the question concerning ‘keeping strategic
industries in national hands’ was asked, it reminded her of corruption and this drove her
away from hostility to the EU towards a more middle-of-the road attitude. This response was
also often met with in comments from other informants. (Geszler et al. 2009)
Essentially, the point is that pragmatic opinions on the EU are often motivated by the
principle of the ‘lesser evil’, the need for regulation and simply by utilitarianism.
The Intune survey data contained a battery of questions which also concerned the
long-term character of the EU. The majority of the European population agreed with
all the investigated potential long-term aims of the EU: social security uniﬁcation; a
uniﬁed tax system; a single foreign policy; and equalisation of regional diﬀerences.
They were most supportive of equalisation and a single foreign policy, but four out of
ﬁve supported the idea of a common social security system and two out of three a
uniﬁed tax system as well.
However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences according to regions concerning these
long-term policy dimensions. Regarding the social security system and regional
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equalisation, East Europeans supported long-term uniﬁcation more strongly than the
rest (see Table 10). Concerning a single foreign policy the opinions of East Europeans
and Mediterraneans were similar, and were close to each other concerning a uniﬁed
tax system as well. However, here the opinions of Mediterraneans were more
supportive.
Knowledge and attachment—clariﬁcation or growing uncertainty?
Through the above-mentioned Intune cooperative eﬀort we carried out a deliberative
poll on a representative sample from a small region. One subject of the inquiry was
unemployment, and the other was participant views on the role and goals of the EU
(Go¨ncz 2009). The method combined a standard opinion poll, intensive small-group
debates involving citizens who originally participated in the survey, and hearings of
experts. Through the deliberations of the small groups there were some changes in
attitudes to the EU: it was seen as being more important to support integration and to
improve EU competitiveness and solidarity, but on the whole, there was a decrease in
the number of those who felt that what was going on at the EU level had an eﬀect on
their lives. Before deliberation two-thirds of respondents had positive attitudes yet
after the weekend discussions only half did. What happened? Did the participants
become disillusioned or uncertain after the debates and expert presentations? An
initial, relatively vague though basically positive image was modiﬁed—for there was a
great degree of ignorance about the EU—and counterarguments and conﬂicting
opinions might also have caused the participants’ uncertainty. Experts often referred
to numerical facts and mentioned that information (for example, about EU grants)
was available on the internet, which to a certain extent frustrated the older
participants who must have felt that they were excluded from something that was
also their business, something that had begun to interest them.
It was not a negative attitude (distrust of the EU) that increased, since participants
were ready to forward a ﬁfth of their taxes to the EU after the deliberation compared
to a tenth at the beginning, and evaluation of the competence of EU decision-makers
also increased. What happened was that the new information brought opinions closer
to reality. The same survey revealed that (concerning knowledge gain) there was a
systematic diﬀerence between textual and numeric questions: quantitative information
was harder to remember (Fishkin et al. 2009).
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TABLE 10
THE CHARACTER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 10 YEARS (GENERAL POPULATION, % OF THOSE WHO ARE
STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF . . .)
Common social
security system
Uniﬁed tax
system
Single foreign
policy
More help for regions
with diﬃculties
West 24.1 22.6 24.5 22.8
Mediterranean 35.1 31.8 34.5 46.8
East 40.4 28.3 32 51.2
Cramer’s V/Phi 0.18**** 0.13**** 0.13**** 0.22****
N 16,514 16,276 16,316 16,685
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This phenomenon can also be checked by Intune comparative data. We ﬁnd that
substantially fewer people can answer questions about quantitative topics than
questions involving qualitative information. In 2007, at the time of the survey, the
number of EU members had just been raised, therefore both 25 and 27 were accepted
as correct answers. Even so, barely over one-third of European respondents
representing the general population could say how many members the EU had. It
was also found—and this can be seen in Table 11—that possessing correct quantitative
knowledge correlated positively with European attachment, and to a lesser extent,
with support for further integration and with the perception of the personal
consequences of EU membership.
By contrast, qualitative knowledge revealed the reverse eﬀect. The overwhelming
majority of individuals correctly identiﬁed anti-unemployment eﬀorts and health care
as being among national (in some member countries sub-national or combined)
competences, and less than a quarter of respondents thought that these areas fell under
the competence of the EU (or they could not answer). However, among those whose
knowledge was incorrect, European attachment and support was signiﬁcantly over-
represented. In this case it was not the eﬀect of a lack of knowledge but, conversely,
positive attachment that led to the illusion in which policy-related discourse and actual
policy competences were fused. The wording ‘mainly dealt with’ in the policy-related
questions also allowed for the illusory interpretation that where there is much
discussion about plans for the future, there is also decision-making competence.
Identity and attachment
One may specify culture and citizenship as being the main factors that constitute
national and European identity. Our empirical investigations, however, revealed
support for other more primordial, unchangeable factors determined by birth. East
European elites were over-represented among those who deﬁned primordial factors as
preconditions for national and European identity (Lengyel & Go¨ncz 2009). Another
interesting ﬁnding in this regard is that the German and French elites did not ascribe
signiﬁcance to their native land or parents as preconditions of national identity (when
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TABLE 11
ATTACHMENT, SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION AND FEELING OF PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES FROM EU
MEMBERSHIP BY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE EU (GENERAL POPULATION, %)
Attachment
to Europe
Support for
integration
‘Consequences for
people like you’
Question* Answer (very attached) (strong) (great)
know_1: Right 27.9 41.7 29.9
number of member states Wrong 19.9 37 26
know_2: Right 21.6 36.6 26.4
unemployment policy Wrong 27.8 44.4 31.2
know_3: Right 22 36.9 27
health policy Wrong 27 44.3 29.6
Notes: *N varies between 18,865 and 16,174 due to missing cases; all connections are signiﬁcant at the
0.0001 level.
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compared to cultural and civil components of identity), whereas the proportion of
those who advocated jus soli and jus sanguinis—being born in Europe and/or coming
from European parents—was above average in deﬁning European identity.
When Roger Martin du Gard wrote a sociological novel about a day in the life of
the small village of Maupeyrou in 1933, he gave it the title Vieille France [Old France].
The Hungarian translator argued for a change of title to Ve´n Euro´pa [Old Europe]. The
author agreed with the change and declared that it coincided with his intention: to
present in a miniature format the general features of the old culture. This story
illustrates a feature of the complex relationship of local, national and supranational
entities. They not only presuppose each other, and not only do the larger include the
smaller ones, but they may condense and replicate each other’s characteristics.
Territorial attachments may mutually exclude or reinforce each other. For some
people it is important to be attached to their nation or settlement but they only weakly
identify with Europe. For others, attachment to the nation does not exclude but rather
supports attachment to Europe. However, in research on this topic it seems likely that
the technique of inquiry makes identiﬁcation with mutually exclusive territories appear
more strongly. If there is a single question which asks about attitudes to national and
European attachment—even if the evaluation is not dichotomous but uses an ordinal
scale—the question implies that there are two poles, the national and the European,
and they are each other’s opposites (Fligstein 2010). There are people, of course, for
whom the two concepts mutually preclude one another. Others, however, are easily
attached to both nation and Europe. This case applies to most of the elites; and if we
do not use a single question for inquires about territorial attachments but several
separate questions, then we can ﬁnd that there is a positive connection between
supranational and national, or European and local identities. It is thereby disproved
that strong attachment to the nation, region or locality contradicts European identity.
The overwhelming majority of national elites identify with Europe, with only one elite
member in every seven rejecting it. National and sub-national attachments thus
positively correlate with European attachment. General population surveys have
shown that an exclusively national attachment is not predominant in Europe.
Territorial attachments existing side by side in union are more prevalent among people
than the one that suggests exclusiveness (Inglehart 1970; Haller 2007, 2008; Haller
et al. 2009b). What proved true in previous research also holds true in the Intune
survey: territorial attachments are signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with each
other (see Table 12).
The imperial perspective
Those who interpret supranational integration as a threat to national values, culture
and society often associate the EU with images of a formidable empire (‘the Roman
army of our age’ as one young interviewee who deﬁantly insisted on his extreme
rightwing stance declared). In public thinking—especially within the ideological
medium of rightist and leftist populism—the concept of empire is usually associated
with negative stereotypes. Furthermore, in an East–Central European perspective,
both the Habsburg and the Soviet past elicit recollection of phenomena such as
aggression, territorial expansion, exploitation and oppression rather than security,
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advancement, catching up or equalisation. Memories of the suppression of the 1848
revolution overshadow the late nineteenth century, just as retaliations following the
1956 revolution overshadowed the emergent ‘goulash communism’. This is a
remarkable paradox, for chronologically the positive stereotype came after the
negative one in both cases. Therefore, those who lived to see both phases either
revalued or—more probably—suppressed the image of the negative base. Still,
negative associations appear to have stronger eﬀects in posterity. This is presumably
because they represent a more eﬀective mobilising force; they oﬀer stronger symbolical
clues to the formation of identity than the concepts of progress and security of an
amorphous contour. Suﬃce it to state here that in public thinking the empire is
identiﬁed with great powers of which not much good can be expected—based on
historical stereotypes. The Central European public, on the other hand, is rather
disposed to identify with an idealised image of the historical mission of small nations.5
Thus the notion of empire is an ideologically laden concept eliciting negative
stereotypes in the ﬁrst place, much more so than the concept of nation. It would be
useful, however, to face up to the challenge and deliberate whether applying the term
‘empire’ to the EU has any scientiﬁc merit and whether it has any realistic basis. Such
an inquiry is not quite without precedents. There is research that suggests that the
concept of empire might be a meaningful coordinate in weighing the alternative future
images of the EU (Zielonka 2007; Gravier 2009; Bo¨ro¨cz et al. 2001; Motyl 1997). What
are empires? Diverse answers are given by diﬀerent authors from Eisenstadt to
Hobsbawm and Tilly but their common features, as Gravier convincingly demon-
strated, are the following: empires are supranational compound entities that represent
distinct ideological and cultural patterns diﬀerentiable from their parts, are divided
into centre and periphery, and tend to expand. Expansion is not necessarily executed
by means of aggression. Expansion can also be seen as being motivated by mutually
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TABLE 12
ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE, TO THE COUNTRY, TO THE REGION, AND TO THE SETTLEMENT: CORRELATIONS
WITHIN THE GENERAL POPULATION
Europe Country Region Settlement
Europe
Pearson 1 0.300 0.205 0.142
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 15,760 15,745 15,670 15,733
Country
Pearson 1 0.432 0.393
Sig. 0.000 0.000
N 15,952 16,027
Region
Pearson 1 0.646
Sig. 0.000
N 15,962
5For example, see Kundera’s position in his debate with Havel in 1968 (Kundera 2008; Havel 2008;
Chmel 2008).
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expected advantages. In this interpretive frame, the EU appears to satisfy the criteria
of being an empire in several regards.
In the research literature, territorially contiguous and divided empires, and
somewhat diﬀerently, continental and marine empires, are diﬀerentiated. Motyl
(1997) also speaks about the centre and periphery and points out that mutually
reinforcing political, economic and socio-cultural organisations collect about the
centre where there is a considerable concentration of decision-making power. The
presence or absence of these characteristics separates empires from ethno-territorial
federations. More disputable but useful questions are inspired by another of his
analytical viewpoints. He claims that the elite and population of the centre are
culturally diﬀerentiated from the elite and population of the periphery. Within the
frames of the empire, the relation of the central elite and the peripheral elite is
necessarily dictatorial, whereas the relationship between the elite and the population in
general is not. It is a conceptual question whether the dictatorial character of the elite
hierarchies is regarded as a distinguishing sign of an empire.6 It is, however, a question
open to empirical examination to what extent the elites and the public perceive the
internal relations of the elites to be asymmetrical.
Another question is how realistic it is to identify centre–periphery inequalities within
the EU after the enlargement process. Evidently, Central East European countries
were at a massive disadvantage in all respects at the moment of joining the EU, so the
question is to what extent these disadvantages became preserved and to what extent
there have been deliberate eﬀorts to eliminate them. The phenomenon can be
examined from three angles. One may question whether the laws and regulations—the
institutions in a broader sense—generate inequalities, intentionally or unintentionally.
Secondly, it can be investigated whether in real economic and social processes there
are centre–periphery diﬀerences that are lastingly maintained. Thirdly, it can also be
investigated how people experience and perceive the eﬀects of integration. Symbols
and concepts may have obvious impacts on this perception. East European citizens are
inclined to understand the concept of ‘Core Europe’ suggested by Habermas and
Derrida as a hidden distinction between ﬁrst and second class citizenship (Case 2009),
even if in a wider and pragmatic Euro–Atlantic political context it may have proven a
useful conceptual tool.
There are signiﬁcant East–West diﬀerences both within elites and population
samples in terms of the perception of fair acknowledgement of interest, as shown in
Table 13. A majority of Eastern, but only the minority of Western elites think that EU
decision-makers do not take into account their country’s interests properly. Within the
general population diﬀerences are not so marked because the majority of Western
citizens think the same, but Easterners, again, feel so in greater proportions. More
than four-ﬁfths (an absolute majority) of elite members agreed with the statement that
the interests of some member states carry too much weight at the EU level, but
Easterners, again, emphasised this more than their Western counterparts. Within the
general population the East Europeans felt (in signiﬁcantly greater proportions) that,
on the one hand, the EU is relatively democratic and that decision makers are
competent, but on the other hand they do not care much about what laymen think.
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A model of attachment to Europe
Using a logistic regression model I have tried to summarise the impacts of the above-
discussed dimensions. The dependent variable of the model is the European
attachment of the population. Macro-level indicators included the country’s regional
location, religious classiﬁcation, per capita GDP, indicators of good governance and
the political elite’s attachment to Europe. Individual level variables on the other hand,
besides demography and education, consisted of the following aspects: primordialism,
attachment to country, soft Euroscepticism, knowledge, long-term vision and imperial
perspective.
What one can learn from the model in Table 14 is that, on a macro level, the East–
West diﬀerence has most to do with the respective population’s attachment to Europe.
There is a smaller, but still signiﬁcant diﬀerence between East European and
Mediterranean countries as well. The religious denomination of the country proved to
be insigniﬁcant in explaining the supranational sentiments of the population.
Per capita GDP has a slightly negative impact on European attachment and that of
good governance is mixed (regulatory quality has a positive impact, while rule of law
and control of corruption a negative impact) if it is controlled for regional diﬀerences
and individual characteristics of the interviewees. The interesting observation at a
macro level is that the impact of the elite’s European attachment is signiﬁcant and
positive. That is, if measured using the proportion of members of the political elite
who are very attached to Europe and controlled for religious, regional, economic and
political country-indicators, the more a country’s political elite has supranational
sentiments the more the respective population shares them. To the extent that this
relationship exists, European identity formation might be indeed called a ‘project’.
Among micro-level indicators, gender and age slightly, and higher education
strongly inﬂuence European attachment. Knowledge about the EU has a double
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TABLE 13
PERCEPTION OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF INTEREST WITHIN THE EU (%)
‘Those who make decisions at the EU level do not take enough account of the
interests of my country’
Strongly
agree
Agree
somewhat
Disagree
somewhat
Strongly
disagree
Neither agree
nor disagree N
Political elite
West 7.1 25.9 47.8 14.4 4.7
East 21.4 42.1 27.8 5.6 3.2
Total 12.6 32.2 40.1 11.0 4.1 1,212
Economic elite
West 5.7 33.0 44.8 12.6 3.9
East 13.7 48.1 27.0 6.6 4.6
Total 8.7 38.8 38.0 10.3 4.1 629
General population
West 22.4 38.3 28.9 7.8 2.5
East 28.1 44.2 17.9 4.8 4.9
Total 24.5 40.5 24.8 6.7 3.4 16,351
Note: all connections are signiﬁcant at the 0.0001 level.
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impact. Knowledge of quantitative facts has a positive, and qualitative information a
weak negative connection, with European attachment. Taking a critical imperial
perspective—supposing that EU decision-makers do not take properly into account
the interests of one’s country—has a slight connection, while pragmatic Euroscepti-
cism has a strong negative connection with European attachment. Primordialism has a
weak negative connection, and supporting EU policy competences in the long run has
a strong positive connection with European attachment. Attachment to country
proves to be not only signiﬁcant and positive, but the most important single factor at
an individual level to positively inﬂuence the European attachment of the population.
Concluding remarks
This essay—based on a comparative survey of 16 countries—investigated the
attachment to Europe of national elites and their respective publics. It identiﬁed a
signiﬁcant gap between the supranational attachment of elites and the public and
raised a set of interconnected questions. Are there similarities among post-socialist
countries concerning supranational attachment? Do they diﬀer from their West
European and Mediterranean counterparts? What does the connection between
national and supranational attachment look like? Do these attachments weaken or
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TABLE 14
A MODEL OF ATTACHMENT TO EUROPE (GENERAL POPULATION, BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION,
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ATTACHED)
B Sig. Exp(B)
WME(1) Western* 2.134004 1.52E-09 8.448631
WME(2) Mediterranean* 1.315906 3.4E-08 3.728126
Religion(1) Catholic country** 0.094363 0.690329 1.098959
Religion(2) Protestant country** 0.223461 0.426296 1.250397
Control of corruption 70.06932 2.1E-06 0.933024
Rule of law 70.03403 0.020138 0.96654
Regulatory quality 0.13434 3.25E-12 1.143782
GDP per capita 2006 74.3E-05 4.15E-05 0.999957
Proportion of political elite strongly
attached to Europe
0.039019 4.12E-20 1.03979
male 70.09591 0.014626 0.908542
Age 50þ 0.105499 0.009814 1.111265
Highly educated 0.397902 1.91E-17 1.488699
Country has not beneﬁted from membership 71.05483 6.8E-133 0.348252
Country’s interest is not taken into account
enough in EU decisions
70.18077 7.33E-06 0.834627
Attachment to the country 1.689253 4E-167 5.415435
Primordial view 70.12024 0.007855 0.88671
Long term view on EU policy competences 0.454573 5.8E-99 1.575501
know1 (number of member states) 0.379265 4.44E-16 1.46121
know2 (unemployment policy) 70.09604 0.065438 0.908424
know3 (health policy) 70.17842 0.000992 0.836591
Constant 75.32003 4.88E-08 0.004893
Notes: *categorical variable, point of comparison: East.
**Categorical variable, point of comparison: Orthodox.
Cox & Snell R square¼ 0.21; Nagelkerke R square¼ 0.29; correctly predicted 74.9%; N¼ 17,129.
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strengthen each other? What are the macro and micro explanatory factors of citizens’
attachment to Europe? Is there a diﬀerence between attachment to Europe and
attachment to the EU?
The research described in this essay veriﬁed that there is a positive connection
between national and supranational attachment—even if one controls for individual
and regional level diﬀerences. Other things being equal, West Europeans, and to a
lesser extent Mediterraneans, are more attached to Europe than East European
citizens. Research revealed that citizens’ supranational attachment is positively
inﬂuenced when similar—and as a rule more intensive—feelings about attachment are
held by political elites.
Another lesson is that, for the sake of conceptual clarity, it is useful to distinguish
between attachment to Europe and attachment to the European Union. Although
both may positively correlate with support for integration, compounding them may
mislead decision-making elites and the wider public as well. Results are contingent
upon survey design, but there is evidence which suggests that, when asked in separate
surveys or split ballots, attachment to Europe is more widely felt than attachment to
the EU. This is intuitively plausible for geographical and cultural reasons, but is worth
verifying on a Europe-wide scale.
There are two general remarks to be connected to these ﬁndings. First, in relation to
European attachment and the nature of remembering, the contradictory character of
European attachment derives from the fact that it is popular, but it is only a moderate
mobilising force. When no crisis or conﬂict looms large, many choose attachment as
their social point of orientation, but in times of crisis it has little appeal (unless the
target of conﬂict is European attachment itself, in the teeth of some external threat).
When, however, there are internal conﬂicts, they may be easily suppressed by national
or ethnic viewpoints. This is revealed by the unsympathetic attitude in Germany
towards the Greek ﬁnancial crisis in spring 2010, or the Hungarian–Slovakian conﬂict
about the question of granting of citizenship to Hungarians living abroad.
Although there are institutions and organisational interests which aﬀect suprana-
tional attachment, they seem not to be so eﬀective, convincing or able to mobilise as in
the case of national or sub-national attachment. Europe—let alone the European
Union—has not often been written about by poets, thundered about by politicians or
taught about by teachers, and more importantly, it has not often been a topic of
conversation within the family and circle of friends as an object of attachment. That is
also part of the common story, serving as an additional explanation for why it is hard
to kindle heart-felt sentiments about Europe. Some evidence suggests that political
learning is important for elite settlements. One may argue that political learning from
others and cultural remembering are also equally important preconditions for
integration as far as public sentiments are concerned.
Some tend to remember mainly the glorious past and some are emotionally stirred
and united by cherished memories of commonly experienced injustices, suﬀering and
threats. Surveys have found that national attachment and pride diﬀer in that there is a
mutual correlation between national pride and a sort of disposition for intolerance.
We can only guess what the memory of suppression, injustice and threat predisposes
people to. It may predispose them to empathy and tolerance, but it is possible that
they can be driven to selﬁshness, trickery and illiberal notions as well.
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The other remark concerns the role of symbols and concepts in the creation of a
European vision. If we focus less on the institutions and more on the processes and
perceptions of them, we see that, after the integration of the post-socialist countries,
they were shifted into a new institutional space, a peripheral situation in the EU. East
Europeans are (slightly more than average) satisﬁed with the competence of EU
decision makers and the way democracy works in the EU. On the other hand they feel
also (above the average) that EU decision makers do not take their countries’ and their
personal interests suﬃciently into consideration. This suggests that the modal East
European understanding is that the EU is not very fair to them, but it is ruled by
competent people in a relatively democratic way. One may add that they feel it is a
little better and more competently managed polity than their national polities. The
question is not merely about what disadvantages they face and how people perceive
them here and now. The more important question is what the tendencies reveal. In any
‘imperial age’, even the fastest changes are measured in decades and symbols may have
generational impacts. This is why the concepts of a ‘core Europe’ or a ‘two-speed
Europe’ may strengthen negative stereotypes which are interwoven with the vision of
the EU as empire, in the long run.
Corvinus University
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